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The received theory of wage-maximising labour-managed or cooperative 
firms (LMFs) cites three fundamental deficiences caused by their 
short-run behaviour: the failure of the labour market to clear; the 
inefficient utilisation of employed labour; a high 
unemployment-inflation trade off due to firms' nonpositive employment 
response to price changes. The paper proposes an automatic transfer 
mechanism, coupled with the auctioneer organisation of the labour 
market, that transforms the LMF's equilibrium into a convex
combination of equilibria of the uncontrolled cooperative and of the 
conventional profit-maximising firm, with their weights being freely 
determined by appropriate specification of a transfer function. The 
scheme is thus able to significantly improve allocative efficiency, 
ensuring altogether labour market clearance and the strictly positive 
employment reaction by wage-maximising cooperatives.
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The traditional Illyrian theory of labour-management (Ward, 1958; 
Domar, 1966; 1970; Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972) identifies the
labour-managed or cooperative firm (LMF) with an enterprise run by its 
workers who equally share in firm's income and collectively set firm 's 
policies so as to maximise income per unit of employed labour, which 
may also be labelled full wage or dividend.
It is well understood that such a maximisation strategy will have 
negative implications for the functioning of a labour-managed economy, 
which appears to markedly differ from that of a system composed of 
entrepreneurial profit-maximising firms. Three problems, linked to a 
firm 's short-run behaviour are usually considered to deserve most 
attention: the non-zero excess demand equilibrium in the labour market 
(Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970); the suboptimal allocation of employed
social labour (Domar, 1966; Bergson, 1967), and the firms' zero 
(Steinherr and Thisse, 1979) if not negative (Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966; 
Bonin and Fukuda, 1986) employment reaction to price changes, with 
unfavourable impact on the economy's unemployment-inflation trade off 
(Bonin, 1981) and, due to the consequential sluggish or even negative 
output response, on the LMFs' chances to survive in competition
against flexibly adapting profit-maximising firms (Montias, 1986)1.
Due to the basic character of issues involved, the short-run 
behaviour of a cooperative provided the focus for much of the 
subsequent analysis of labour-management and several recipes how to 
correct the detected anomalies emerged.
One group consists of proposals that, in one way or another, modify 
the initially defined principles of worker-management (Meade, 1972; 
Ireland and Law, 1978; Bonin, 1981; Serlel, 1982; Miyazaki and Neary, 
1983). Another class comprises corrective schemes that fully retain
the original institutional design of the labour-managed enterprise 
(Thomson, 1982; Cuesnerie and Laffont, 1984).
It is the aim of this paper to propose an incentive mechanism that 
would combine two desirable properties of some of the existing
solutions: the principle of automatic control of a firm's behaviour,




























































































live character of the Thomson and the Guesnerie-Laffont proposals.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The presentation of the 
mechanism appears in pari 2. Its impact on the allocation of labour 
and risk is analysed in part 3. In parts 4 and 5 a firm's comparative 
statics is studied and some implications for the functioning of 
cooperative markets are outlined. A discussion of the model is left 
for part 6.
2. The Transfer Mechanism
The firm uses a fixed non-depreciating capital stock of value K and a 
homogeneous labour L to produce output X vJa production function 
X = X(l), characterised with U-shaped average variable costs schedule.
It sells competitively at a price p and pays parametric rental rK, 
where r  is the current rate of interest. The firm 's income is 
Y = (pX - rK), with y = Y/L being the income per worker. It is the
maximisation of y that is responsible for the listed deficiencies of
worker-management.
Suppose now that, in responding to the anomalies observed, the
state establishes an allocation fund. The Fund defines the calculated
wage or the tax exemption w, setting at the same time its minimum
value w0. The (calculated) profits emerging from this procedure amount 
to n = (Y - uL), with n = (y - w) being the profit per worker.
The Fund then levies an allocation tax on profitable firms, 
subsidising at the same time those that are making losses, where the 
transfer rate t depends on a firm 's rate of profits, p = It/K. The
complete schedule of transfer rates is defined by the following
cnntiniously twice differentiable function in p:
t = t ip )  ; t e (0, 1) ; p e [pB, p j\ < 0>  (1)
U l , .—  € ( -» , +oo ) ;
dp
P d ( 1 -  t )
1 -  t dp “ e 
£ 0
( 2 )
In (1) p. is the profit rate that corresponds to the shut down locus 




























































































employment level the locus defines the lowest price at which a firm
may still operate, i.e., at which its equilibrium rule of (8) still
applies. Also in (1), p„ is the highest profit rate attainable by any 
p rofJ t-maximising firm in a specified time period. In (2) e represents 
a parameter of the t function, identified with the elasticity of
transfer complement with respect to a firm'» rate of profit, and
hereafter referred to as the allocation parameter.
The implementation of the above mechanism makes the (after 
transfer) dividend the following continiously twice differentiable
function in L:
z = v + n i l  -  t )  ; L e |LS . Lm )\{Lp, La ) ( 3 )
i.a = a r g  min pB ; p = ^  ( 4 )
L *
vL + ( r  + pm )K
L„ = a r« mln P„ : Pm =   (5)
L X
L = a r g  max p ( 6 )
P  L
L 0 = a r g  pQ ; p„ = p ( t - 0 ) ( 7 )
= 0
In (3) the points L and are excluded from the fun ction 's domain
since in their vicinity z need not necessarily be differentiable. Such
a procedure is permisible as Lp will actually never be reached by the 
firm - see section 3.1 below - while at L0 the firm behaves like an 
ordinary profit maximiser. The price locus p„ of (5) is consistent 
with the already defined maximum profit rate p„. Note that the minimum 
of p„ corresponds to pm attained by the profit-maximising firm which, 
in the short run, also maximises profit per unit of capital.
In what follows we shall call z simply the dividend, and will
reserve the term "income per worker" to denote the before transfer
magnitude y.






























































































pLX" 11 + e)2 ♦ ne < 0 ( 9 )
where X'  and X" are  the first and the second derivative o f  X(L).
We shall sometimes refer to the automatically controlled 
labour-managed firm that follows the allocation rule of (8) as to the 
j-I.MF, or simply LMF, and will associate the term "Illyrian firm", 
l-l.MF, with the "uncontrolled" behaviour of an untaxed or neutrally 
taxed cooperative.
3. The Allocation of Labour and Risk
We assume throughout that J-L.MF and l-LMF sell at a same price and 
face same unit costs of labour and capital as the entrepreneurial 
firm. Also, following (1), we only consider non-zero profit states.
3.1 Moving a Firm's Equilibrium
By differentiating (8) with respect to e, we first examine the 
sensitivity of the LMF equilibrium to changes in the allocation 
parameter:
Applying (9) to (10), the following proposition is obtained:
P I .  8 change in the e parameter to the LMF leads to a change in its 
demand for labour in the same (opposite) direction when profits are 
positive (negative)
To determine the limiting cases of a firm's equilibrium, we first 
assume e = 0, when (8) immediately reduces to the well-known Illyrian 
rule:
pX’ = w + n ( 1 1 )
In examining the second limiting case, we first consider the state
dL 
de






























































































of positive profits. As (11) defines a maximum of it, which is strictly 
concave in L, PI indicates that for any positive e the LMF employment 
level is greater than that of the Illyrian firm, falling into the 
interval where n is decreasing in L. By letting e to tend to infinity 
it then follows that the variable part of (8) will be converging to 
zero so that, in the limit, the LMF equilibrium will reduce to that of 
the profit-maximising firm.
According to PI, in the case of negative profits a rise in e 
increases the arithmetic value of it in (8), so that the result on 
convergence is not immediately at hand. We therefore differentiate the 
left-hand side of (8) with respect to e and determine the algebraic
sign of the derivative using P I:




n < 0 ( 1 2 )
Thus, the arithmetic value of n/(l + e) of (8) is strictly decreasing 
in e, while the denominator of this fraction approaches infinity when 
e tends to infinity. But this implies that the above expression must 
be converging to zero when e approches infinity. Hence, in the case of 
negative profits the equilibrium of the entrepreneurial firm also 
represents the limiting case of the LMF equilibrium:
pX* = v  (13)
After defining the limiting cases, we finally represent (8) in the 
form:
px' = r f e  w + r r s  y (8a)
This shows the LMF equilibrium to have the allocation properties 
formally identical with that of a codetermined firm (see, for example, 
Svejnar, 1982), i. e., to be a convex combination of equilibria of the 
entrepreneural and of the Illyrian firm. Since in the present model 
their weights may freely be determined, there is a reason to expect 
that the centre will exploit this advantage in coping with the 





























































































To identify the impact of the mechanism on allocative efficiency, we 
first define the index of misallocation of labour by the l-LMF:
II, = | ( p x ; /v )  -  1| ( 1 4 )
where w is the value marginal product of labour of the entrepreneurial 
firm of (13), which allocates labour optimally, pXJ being the 
corresponding Illyrian magnitude of (11). We then take P, as a base 
for generally defining the measure of a firm’ s allocative efficiency
as:
a  = | (ft//3, ) -  1| ( 1 5 )
where a , = 0 and oE = I will be the respective Illyrian and
entrepreneurial indices.
We now introduce the LMF indices p j = I(pXj/w) - 1| and
“ j = l(0j/0|) - I I ,  where pXj denotes the LMF value marginal product 
of labour that appears in (8) and (12). The latter relation indicates
that P j is decreasing in e. Hence otj is increasing in e and is
strictly positive, which means that the LMF allocates labour better
than the Illyrian firm.
To see how much better the LMF allocation is, we represent Pj and 
P, with the right hand sides of (8) and and (11), respectively, to 
calculate:
where Hj and n, denote the respective values of n in (8) and (11). By 
the strict concavity of n and by definition of «, as the maximum of n 
in L, we have from (16): p < 1 <= n > 0; otj < e/ (l + e) «■ n < 0, 
i.e., for profitable firms the efficiency index will be somewhat 
greater than e/ (l + e), while for unsuccesful ones the opposite will 
be the case. This makes it meaningful to hypothesise p = 1 in (16),
and to interpret the resulting value of *j, denoted aJ ;  as an 





























































































1 + e ( 1 7 )
We may therefore state the following allocation property of the LMF:
P2. Faced with the e parameter of value e* the LHF achieves an average 
efficiency level e * / ( l  + e ’ ) ,  when the Illyrian and the entrepreneu­
rial firm achieve 0  and 1,  respectively
In the case of a mixed labour-managed economy P2 implies that by ex 
ante postulating e for all LMFs, the centre will create within the 
cooperative sector an average efficiency gain of e/ (l + e ) .  By
increasing e the centre will thus be able to systematically reduce 
output losses caused by the principle of dividend maximisation.
To establish the limit of the scheme in improving allocative 
efficiency, we choose some arbitrarily small positive finite h and
define aj) = (1 -  h) as the value of <*j in (16) that denotes the state 
of an "almost" optimal allocation of labour. As in (16) otj converges 
from below to unity as e tends to infinity, it follows that there 
always must exist some sufficiently large finite e for which <*j = o|J 
We therefore obtain the following proposition on the LMF limit 
allocative efficiency:
P3. The LMF can achieve an almost optimal allocation of labour
3.3 Risk Shifting
To identify the limit impact of the mechanism on the allocation of 
risk, we temporarily introduce in the model uncertainty, assuming
altogether risk aversion on the part of workers. We then choose some
arbitrarily small positive finite g to define the transfer rate
t ,  = (1 -  g) as the state of an "almost" optimal allocation of risk.
We then solve (3) for (:
As, due to the specification of dt/dp in (2), t converges from below 




























































































exist some sufficiently large finite e for which t = t , .  Hence, the
following proposition on the risk shifting by a cooperative may be 
established:
1*4. The THF can achieve an almost optimal allocation of risk
4. The Effects of a Change in Calculated Wage
It is a well-known property of the Illyrian firm that it is 
insensitive to variations in the institutionally imposed labour cost 
or the calculated wage. This leaves the centre without an instrument 
that would be naturally suited to cope with the rigidities of the 
Illyrian labour market. It is therefore of interest to establish
w hether or how the controlled LMF will react to changes in the w 
parameter.
4.1 The Uage-Employment Response and the Collection of Demand 
for Labour Schedules
To examine the LMF employment reaction to a change in the calculated 
wage, we replace n with (y -  v) in (8) and differentiate the equation 
with respect to w to obtain:
(1 + e ) fpLX"(1 + e ) 2 ♦ nel
which, in the limits, displays the Illyrian zero reaction (e = 0) and 
the entrepreneurial positive response (e ^  m). Within these limits, 
applying (9) to (19), it appears that the following proposition on the 
LMF sensitivity to variations in the standard labour costs holds:
P5.  A change i n  the calculated wage to the LHF leads to a change in 
its demand for labour in the opposite direction
Thus P5, which describes movements along a demand for labour curve 
generated by a given value of the e parameter, shows this curve to be 
negatively sloped in w .
At the same time PI, combined with P5, indicates that by increasing 
e from zero to infinity one obtains an infinite number of negatively 




























































































(vertical) Illyrian (D ,) and entrepreneurial (VMPL) schedules, are 
depicted in figure 1, where VMPL (= pX'), VNAPL (=  y), and
VAPl (=  pX/L) denote the value marginal, the value net average, and 
the value average product of labour, respectively.
I F i g u r e  1 about here]
4.2 Clearing the Labour Market un de r  Worker-Management
It now appears that the defined mechanism makes calculated wage the 
instrument for clearing the labour market in a cooperative economy, 
provided the same occurs in the twin entrepreneurial system.
Thus, in the case of a fixed aggregate labour supply, the centre 
will gradually increase e until it generates the aggregate demand 
curve for labour which intersects the aggregate labour supply schedule 
at least at the point of the minimum calculated wage defined in
section 2.1.
It emerges however that the centre will be able to clear the 
cooperative market for labour in the case of elastic aggregate labour 
supply as well.
If the information on the current value of the dividend is public3, 
the aggregate labour supply will be increasing in z of (3). It follows 
that for the proper employment equilibrium to be ensured, the labour 
supply should not be a decreasing function of the calculated wage w, 
since the demand for labour has already been established to be 
decreasing in that parameter. But the differentiation of (3) with 
respect to w gives:
-  » ( 20 )
This indicates that the following proposition on the sensitivity of 
labour supply holds:
P6. A change in the calculated wage In an economy populated with LMFs 





























































































At the same time, changes in the allocation parameter will have no 
impact on the labour supply schedule as a function of v, since the 
differentiation of (3) with respect to e exactly yields:
dz
de
= 0 ( 21)
It follows that, similar to the case of a fixed labour supply, the 
centre will start the adjustment process by gradually increasing the 
allocation parameter. This will lead to anti-clockwise "rotation” of 
the aggregate demand curve for labour uhtil it intersects the 
afff?rcl5afe labour supply schedule at the point equal to or greater than 
the minimum calculated wage.
In summary, we conclude that by manipulating the allocation 
parameter and acting as an auctioneer in the labour market the centre 
will, both in the case of a fixed and elastic labour supply,
eventually find the market clearing calculated wage which, at the same 
time, will not fall short of its critical magnitude, determined by the 
minimum tax exemption.
5. The Effects of a Change in Product Price
Finally, we come to the probably most debated issue raised by the 
short-run behaviour of the Illyrian firm - to the cooperative's 
negative employment response to a change in the product price and to 
the resulting negative output reaction. How does the controlled LMF 
behave in this situation?
To calculate the LMF response to price variations, we differentate 
(8) with respect to p to Obtain:
x(LX' ♦ 1 )
dL ( - X  1 ♦ e)
dp
pLX"  (1  + e  )2 +
which, in the limits, displays the Illyrian negative response (e = 0) 
and the entrepreneurial positive reaction (e ><»).
As, due to (9), the denominator of (22) is negative, the 




























































































be consistent with the negativity of the numerator of this expression. 
By calculating LX'/X from (8) and substituting it into (22) the latter 
requirement eventually reduces to:
e > a ; ( 2 3 )
To ensure the positive employment (and ouput) response in the whole 
range of relevant prices, and thus also the positive slope of the 
entire product supply curve, we determine e so that:
where £., is that of (4), defining the minimum of the p. locus.
Suppose now that, faced with the e parameter of (24), the firm 
finds itself at some point (p *, L, ) of p ., where L. * Lt. Since at 
such point profit is negative, PI implies that L, is greater than the 
corresponding employment level of the entrepreneurial firm, and thus 
necessarily greater than Lt of (24). Hence at L = L. (23) holds, and 
dL/dp is positive. We then differentiate a of (23) with respect to p, 
to obtain:
doc _ f-rK) dL
dp “ (vL2J dp
( 2 5 )
This shows a to be decreasing in p in the vicinity of p j. Furthermore, 
since a is continiously differentiable in p there always must exist 
some interval IpJ, p j ) where (23) holds, and where, due to the 
consequential positiveness of dL/dp, a is monotonically decreasing in 
p. Suppose now that a reaches the minimum at p j. But it is seen from 
(25) that this can only happen if dL/dp is equal to zero. However, at 
p\ (23) holds, and dL/dp is strictly positive. Hence, a does not have 
a minimum at p j. The infinite repetition of the argument reveals that 
(23) holds in the entire relevant price region Ip ', p ') ,  where 
p' = ?„((-„). with Lm being defined in (5). We therefore conclude that 
the following proposition on the LMF's response to price variations 
generally holds:
P7. 4 change in the product price to the LMF leads to a change In Its 




























































































Thus P7, which describes movements along the product supply curve 
generated by a selected value of the e parameter, shows this curve to 
be positively sloped in p.
(figure 2 about here1
At the same time PI, combined with P7, indicates that by letting e 
to tend from its critical value of (24) to infinity, one obtains an 
infinite number of positively sloped supply schedules. Some of these 
schedules, bordered by the coresponding Illyrian (S ,) and
entrepreneurial (MC) curves, are depicted in figure 2, where
MC ( =  v/X'), ATC 1= (wL +  rK)/X] and AVC (=  uL/X) denote the marginal, 
the average total, and the average variable costs, respectively*.
6. Discussion
In this paper we have defined a simple mechanism of incentive 
transfers, coupled with dn auctioneer mechanism in the labour market, 
that improves the short-run performance of competitive labour-managed 
firms and economies without modifying their institutional 
arrangements.
The basic effects created by its operation may be summarised as
follows. First, it makes both the users and the suppliers of labour to
react to variations in the institutionally imposed labour cost or the 
calculated wage in the qualitatively same way as they would respond to 
changes in the market wage in an entrepreneurial system. The 
calculated wage thus becomes an instrument which secures, through the 
auctioneer procedure, the clearing of the labour market under
worker-management. Second, the mechanism can maintain an almost 
optimal allocation of labour - i. e, it can keep the efficiency losses
at some arbitrarily small finite level - completely automatically. 
Finally, in the same way it also ensures firms' proper employment and 
output response to changes in the product price, thus lowering the
unemployment-inflation trade off in the cooperative economy and 




























































































process is that of financial control and reduces, at the end of the 
accounting period, to the enforcement of correct information on the
profitability level achieved by a firm.
Not unlike most other proposals, the developed scheme can be seen 
in two ways - as a theoretical solution to the inefficiency problem of 
labour-management, and as a potential policy prescription.
However, if the latter view of the scheme is adopted, aside from 
having to upgrade it in order to deal with the problems such as
adjustment costs, the labour heterogeneity or monopolistic
distortions, one would also have to address an additional issue raised 
by the operation of the mechanism itself. According to Proposition 3 
an almost optimal allocation of labour is achieved by sticking to the
large finite values of the e parameter. On the other hand, Proposition 
4 states that with such as the transfer rates will almost be equal to 
unity, which means that a firm will practically be shifting all of its 
risk - a situation similar to that of the Miyazaki-Neary,
Guessnerie-l.affont, and Thomson solutions, which assume an exactly 
complete risk shifting.
Though favourable from the viewpoint of risk averse workers, the 
problem with such an outcome is that it would almost certainly raise
the issue of incentives and is thus unlikely to be feasible in
practice. If one therefore opts for some more than a negligible amount 
of risk to be allotted to the cooperative, this will be achieved by
replacing the large finite es of P3 and P4 with the reasonably large
ones, greater than the higher of critical values of the e parameter,
discussed in parts 4 and 5. This will create an environment that might 
still be acceptable for the risk averse workers but will also allow
for certain dispersion of earnings across firms. However, it would 
altogether bring a lower allocative efficiency and more sluggish 
output responses to price changes than with an almost optimal risk 
shifting. Thus, to a certain extent, the LMF will lag behind the
entrepreneurial firm, both in its allocation performance and in the 
intensity of its output reactions5.
The latter issue, though not necessarily the former, might be of
practical interest to the proponents of worker-management. As 




























































































of entrepreneurial firms over worker cooperatives precisely reduces to 
a greater ability of the former to flexibly adapt to demand signals, 
which in the longer run would result in the insignificant share of 
cooperative sector in the total output of a society - a situation 
which does not contradict that of the actual organisationally open 
environments.
O f course, one may argue that the flexibility lag of controlled 
LMFs, in contrast with that of uncontrolled cooperatives, is unlikely 
to give a decisive advantage to entrepreneurial firms. Nevertheless, 
from the policy perspective it might still be interesting to
investigate whether institutionally non-distortive mechanisms could be 
designed which, perhaps by scaling down the quest for allocative 
efficiency, will enable the risk bearing LMFs t o ' respond to demand 
signals with exactly equal or maybe greater intensity than the 
flexibly adapting profit maximisers. A discussion of this theme, 
somewhat neglected by the existing literature on labour-management, 
would however go beyond what has been set to explore on the present 
occasion and will be pursued in a separate paper.
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1. A comprehensive survey of the worker-management literature, which 
covers a discussion of the quoted Illyrian deficiencies, can be found 
in Bonin and Putterman (1987). A useful textbook source is Ireland and 
Law (1982).
2. The derivation of any equation is available on request.
3. In the presence of asymmetric information on the profit component 
of dividend the argument presented below will hold a fortiori.
4. The Illyrian supply curve, determined from (8), is defined by:
P<X) = (rK/X) |t)/(ti -  1)1,  where » = MC/AVC.




























































































Fi^.  1: The Collection of Demand for Labour Curves 




























































































Tig. 2:  The Collection of Product Supply Curves 
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